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Abstract 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to explore ways in which cybernetics leads to 
distinctive ways of acting. 
Design/methodology/approach – Paralleling von Foerster’s argument that it makes more 
sense to speak of the cybernetics of epistemology than the epistemology of cybernetics, the 
author argues that cybernetics is not one form of practice amongst others but an account of 
what it is to practice, understood as where we relate how we act to how we understand so 
that each informs the other. The author explores the potential difference that adopting this 
understanding of practice makes in practice and shows its significance by establishing 
connections between the eponymous cybernetic example of steering and questions regarding 
teleology in ethics. 
Findings – While all practice is cybernetic in the sense of involving a relationship between 
understanding and acting, the relationship between cybernetics and practice is not a neutral 
one. Understanding practice in cybernetic terms enables us to pursue goods internal to the 
practice, which, in turn, makes a difference to how we act. 
Practical implications – The author argues that how we understand the relation between our 
understanding and our acting (our theories of theory and practice) leads to significant 
differences of action in practice. 
Originality/value – The author argues that cybernetics has non-neutral, and ethically 
significant, consequences in practice that are beyond the application of cybernetics to 
practice or the advantages of adopting explicitly conversational ways of acting. 
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1. Cybernetics and practice 
While cybernetics is primarily a way of understanding – of thinking, theorising or explaining – 
it is also closely related to how we act. There are many aspects to this. It is particularly 
evident in the performative quality of some cybernetic research, such as that of Ashby, Walter 
and Pask, who played out their ideas using physical experimental devices (a quality which 
has been emphasised by Pickering, 2010). There are similarities between this and current 
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thinking in art and design about practice-based research and this is one basis of the various 
collaborations between cybernetics and disciplines such as art and design, as explored in the 
2010 Cybernetics: Art, Design, Mathematics – A Meta Disciplinary Conversation conference 
of the American Society for Cybernetics (ASC) in Troy (Glanville, 2012; Glanville and 
Sweeting, 2011). Indeed, there is a substantial relation between cybernetics and design in 
terms of the circular, conversational structure that they both share (see for instance: Dubberly 
and Pangaro, 2007; Fischer, 2014; Glanville, 2007a, c, 2009; Jachna, 2011; Jonas, 2007; 
Krippendorff, 2007; Sweeting, 2011). Glanville has developed this analogy to the extent that 
he claims that “cybernetics is the theory of design and design is the action of cybernetics” 
(Glanville, 2007c, p. 1178) and I return, therefore, to the example of design again below in 
order to explore the relation between cybernetics and practice. 
Underlying these different examples is the way that the epistemology of cybernetics 
challenges the boundary between how we understand and how we act, and so between 
theory and practice. First, as is reflected on in second-order cybernetics, theory is something 
that we construct and so is, itself, a form of practice. Second, cybernetics understands our 
explanations of our actions (understanding, theory) as integrated together with our acting in a 
circular relationship, as explored by the ASC’s 2013 Acting-Learning-Understanding 
conference in Bolton (Glanville, 2014; Glanville et al., 2014). This circularity between 
understanding and action is exemplified in the eponymous cybernetic example of steering a 
ship, where the steersman’s understanding of the effects of his or her action informs how he 
or she continues to act. This contrasts with where we try to apply theory linearly to practice or, 
vice versa, where we fail to situate theory in such a way that it can lead to new ways of 
acting.  
Recent ASC conferences have reflected on these themes, drawing on the idea, as 
proposed by Mead (1968) to the inaugural meeting of the ASC, that a cybernetic society be 
run according to cybernetic insights. While the principle legacy of Mead’s paper was the 
epistemological turn of second-order cybernetics – the idea that cybernetics be applied to 
itself, as developed by von Foerster (1974/1995, 2003a) and others – the ASC has returned 
to the original context of Mead’s question to consider how cybernetics might be practiced 
cybernetically [1]. This question has been explored in the format as well as the content of the 
conferences, which have been structured in a conversational, and so cybernetic, manner. 
This format has offered advantages as an alternative to the traditional paper delivery model 
[2]. The constrained and predetermined nature of paper presentations, often across several 
parallel sessions, can tend to restrict the possibilities for exchange, research and learning 
during the conference itself (Glanville, 2011; Pask, 1979). The conversational format, by 
contrast, allows papers to develop in response to discussions and leads to the composition of 
new research questions, which can be worked on collaboratively during the conference. While 
these advantages are applicable across academic practice, the conversational format has 
further significance in the context of cybernetics, in that participants can explore cybernetic 
ideas by acting them out in the performance of the conference itself. This has parallels with 
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the performative experimentation of Pask and others and, also, with the way that, in design 
education, the conversational structure of studio teaching (as described for instance by 
Schön, 1983/1991) is valuable not just because of the pedagogic benefits of “an atmosphere 
[…] conducive to conversation” (von Glasersfeld, 1992, p. 444) but also as an enactment of 
the design process, allowing it to be explored. 
 
2. Acting cybernetically 
While in the context of the ASC conferences, in Pask’s research and in design tutorials, a 
conversational way of acting is primarily an investigation of the topic itself, it offers 
advantages in any case, such as those I have noted above regarding conference 
organisation. These are both practical and also ethical: conversational approaches help us 
deal with complexity, generate new possibilities and, also, in incorporating ethical 
considerations (for instance, regarding others) into our actions. These aspects are all 
manifest in the analogy with designing. While the situations in which designers work are full of 
incomplete and changing requirements such that, as Rittel (1972) describes, they are 
unresolvable by linear methods, designers approach them as a matter of course, creating 
new possibilities in so doing (see for instance: Cross, 2007; Gedenryd, 1998; Glanville, 
2007b, c). That they can do this is largely due to the interactive way in which they work, 
characterised by Schön (1983/1991) as a “reflective conversation with the situation” (p. 76) 
and exemplified by the conversations that designers hold with themselves when sketching 
(Glanville, 2007c). Moreover, this conversational way of working is valuable not just 
practically but also ethically (Kenniff and Sweeting, 2014; Sweeting, 2014). This is partly 
through the way that engagement in dialogue with stakeholders is an integral part of the 
design process rather than something added on to it (as it is sometimes regarded) and, also, 
even through the sorts of conversations that designers hold with themselves through the use 
of drawings and models. That is, even in their more internal processes such as sketching, 
designers put themselves in the place of others by, for instance, “walking through” a plan 
drawing in order to try to understand how what they are designing will be experienced. In this 
way, designers consider those absent stakeholders, such as the future users of a building or 
its passers by, whom they will not be able to meet let alone consult, but who will be affected 
by what they propose. This thinking “through the eyes of the other”, to borrow a phrase which 
von Foerster (1991) attributed to Frankl, is one of several ways in which cybernetic 
processes, such as design, may be said to coincide with ethical considerations or even to 
require them (Glanville, 2004a, 2007c; Poerksen, 2011; von Foerster, 2003b, p. 244, 2003c; 
von Foerster and Poerksen, 2002). 
While this seems to provide a basis for regarding cybernetics as a way of acting to be 
emulated, there are difficulties with maintaining such a position. First, there is an apparent 
neutrality to some cybernetic ideas. The radically constructivist epistemology of cybernetics 
leaves open the possibility of contrasting explanations being equally viable: as von 
Glasersfeld (1990, p. 19) notes, it “would be perjury for a radical constructivist” to insist that 
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their account of epistemology was true. Second, while we can point to the benefits of 
cybernetic ways of acting, it is not always possible to clearly distinguish those actions that are 
cybernetic from those that are not. The step in Rosenblueth et al.’s (1943) proto-cybernetic 
paper “Behaviour, purpose and teleology” that distinguishes those actions that are cybernetic 
in structure from those that are not is that which asks whether they are intrinsically 
purposeful, involving circular feedback mechanisms. This step, however, is ambiguous, 
following from the way that “purpose” can be taken both as a synonym for goal and also as 
the way of acting towards that goal. The examples which Rosenblueth et al. cite as non-
purposeful (a clock, a roulette wheel, a gun), while not exhibiting “intrinsic purposeful 
behaviour” (p. 19) in the same way as a servo-mechanism, can be said to be a purpose in 
themselves (the goal of their designing and making) and can also be used purposefully. While 
these distinctions can be clarified (this ambiguity is one of the issues raised by Taylor (1950a) 
and to which Rosenblueth and Wiener (1950) respond), it follows that the distinction between 
those actions that are cybernetic in their structure from those that are linear depends on how 
we draw the limits of the system and so, in turn, not just on what we are explaining but, also, 
on what aspects of it we are trying to explain. 
There is a sense that we can explain even the most un-cybernetic and linear of 
actions in cybernetic terms – even linear coding, as Glanville (2004b, p. 1382) has noted, can 
be understood as a restricted version of conversation. This is because cybernetics is not 
merely an account of one epistemology amongst others that might be adopted but of the 
basis of epistemology itself – that is, its account, while provisional, is not relativist [3]. As von 
Foerster (2003b) has argued, it makes more sense to speak of the cybernetics of 
epistemology rather than the epistemology of cybernetics and, similarly, Glanville (2006) has 
argued, through his analogy between design and cybernetics, that design and cybernetics are 
at the basis of all human activity: that “to design is to be human, and vice versa” (p. 1). 
Likewise, cybernetics is not one form of practice amongst others (the practice of cybernetics 
or the application of cybernetics to practice), but an account of what it is to practice (the 
cybernetics of practice) and of what distinguishes practice from merely unthinking repetition 
or sequences of unrelated actions. This is not to say that all practice is equally reflective – 
while coding can be understood as a specifically restricted form of conversation, this 
restriction brings with it crucial differences – but even the most linear application of theory to 
practice involves at least some degree of reflective understanding and learning about how 
this is to be done. Practice is therefore always cybernetic in structure, consisting of a circular 
relation between how we act and how we explain or understand that action, familiar from 
examples such as steering, such that our actions are interdependent with how we understand 
them (see, e.g. Glanville, 2014; Martin, 2011; Schön, 1983/1991). 
 
3. Teleology and ethics 
That all practice is cybernetic in this sense means that the relation of cybernetics to practice 
cannot be merely a direct advocacy of those ways of acting that are cybernetic over others 
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which are not. This is not, however, to say that the relationship between cybernetics and 
practice is a neutral one. In this section I outline one way in which understanding practice in 
cybernetic terms, as a circular relation between our acting and understanding, leads to 
significantly different ways of acting. 
As Rosenblueth et al. (1943) showed, the circularity of a cybernetic system, such as 
the relation between action and understanding with which I have characterised practice, 
allows a purpose to be pursued. Rosenblueth et al. (1943, p. 18) defined purpose as follows: 
 
The term purposeful is meant to denote that the act or behaviour may be interpreted 
as directed to the attainment of a goal – i.e., to a final condition in which the behaving 
object reaches a definite correlation in time or in space with respect to another object 
or event. 
 
As Taylor (1950b) argues, this conception of purpose as striving towards a definite final 
condition does not account for vague or unsuccessful activities that are still goal-directed 
although no goal exists, such as “a man groping about in the dark for matches which are not 
there, but which he erroneously believes to be near at hand” or, alternatively, how “the 
alchemist can seek the philosopher’s stone, the knight can seek the Holy Grail” (p. 329). 
While one could answer Taylor’s comments in a variety of ways, there is a sense in 
which they anticipate a richer conception of purpose. This is to see the goal of the target-
seeking torpedo, to use Rosenblueth et al.’s (1943) example, not as the ship itself, or even 
the “apparent focus from which the sound waves emanate” (Rosenblueth and Wiener, 1950, 
p. 321), but of being on course for the ship. Similarly, in the eponymous cybernetic example 
of steering, instead of identifying the destination we are steering towards as the goal, defining 
our action in terms of something external to it, we can equally understand the purpose of 
steering as staying on a steady course in response to changes in the environment and of 
learning how to improve at this, and so as internal to our action. This is not to say that if the 
goals of an action are internal, that it will not also involve external goals or that we must 
choose between these two sorts of goals. Indeed it is the pursuit of the internal goal of being 
on course that allows the external goal of the port (and of alternative destinations) to be 
pursued, while it is the journey to the port that gives the internal goal of steering its relevance 
and context [4]. 
Understanding purpose in this sense, the behaviour of the torpedo can be described 
as purposeful even if the chase goes on indefinitely and there is no final condition, a 
description which could equally be applied to the knight’s quest for the Holy Grail, the 
alchemist’s for the philosopher’s stone or the search for absent matches. This is, notably, the 
sort of purpose that designers pursue: it is not possible to define the conditions at which they 
aim in advance because new understandings and possibilities, and with them new criteria, 
are created during the design process as the situation is explored. It follows that designers do 
not usually attempt to directly fulfil the project brief that they are given at the outset but 
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instead actively put that brief in question, shifting the external goals at which they aim as they 
explore what follows from them. In this, designing is not dissimilar to the ship example where 
the steersman, rather than aiming at one preselected port, uses his or her ability to steer (the 
internal goal of being able to maintain a course) in order to explore different directions and 
destinations. In this way, design takes the form of an open ended and forward looking search 
that, as Pickering (2010) has noted, is characteristic of cybernetic practice more generally. 
The question of whether the goals of our actions are internal or external to them is an 
important one in ethical philosophy, distinguishing between two approaches to understanding 
ethics in terms of teleology: that of, first, the Aristotelian tradition and its revival as virtue 
ethics by, for instance, Anscombe (1958) andMacIntyre (1981/1985, 1988); and, second, that 
of consequentialist ethical theories such as utilitarianism. The senses of teleology and the 
corresponding nature of the telos or goal in each of these are very different. In the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defines the good as the goal at which all things aim (I.1) and 
goes on to argue that the ultimate human goal be understood as that of eudaemonia (I.7), 
usually translated as “happiness”, “the good life” or “human flourishing”, something which is 
intrinsic to and inseparable from the very action of living. In contrast to this, in 
consequentialism an ethical action is one that maximises its good consequences according to 
some way of weighing competing priorities against each other. This understands the goal of 
action as external to it, with the result that any means could be justified if it achieves the 
greatest good overall. 
While the extrinsic nature of the good in consequentialism opens it up to criticisms, 
such as those of Anscombe (1958), the intrinsic nature of the good in virtue ethics leaves it 
with a problem of definition. MacIntyre (1981/1985) defines the good life self-referentially: “the 
good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man”; that is, as a form of 
“quest” (p. 219). In discussing the example of steering a ship, I noted that we can think of the 
goal of the steering as either the external and fixed goal of the port to which it is travelling or, 
alternatively, as the internal goal of maintaining and learning to maintain a course, a goal 
which allows us to take control of the destination we are steering towards. The lack of 
specificity in MacIntyre’s definition, and the corresponding lack of specific moral guidance for 
which virtue ethics has been criticised (e.g. Louden, 1997, pp. 205-206), is in this sense 
essential to it. The definition of some specific final end, such as is attempted in 
consequentialism, would result in the termination of the circularity, and so of the self-
reference, and the end of the possibility of pursuing the good life [5]. 
As part of his wider account, MacIntyre (1981/1985, p. 187) attempts, rather 
unconvincingly, to distinguish between activities that involve the pursuit of internal goods and 
those others that do not – arguing, for instance, that whereas architecture involves internal 
goals, bricklaying does not. Given the circular relationship between acting and understanding 
that, I have suggested, is a quality of all practice, it does not make sense to draw a distinction 
in this way. Both architecture and bricklaying, and indeed any practice, can involve the pursuit 
of internal goods, together with external ones, because the circularity between acting and 
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understanding allows an internal purpose to be pursued. The existence of this possibility is, 
however, no guarantee that internal goals will be pursued: any activity can be reduced to the 
merely transactional pursuit of external goals where we neglect its internal ones. 
The possibility of pursuing internal goals is, therefore, dependent in part on how we 
understand the relation between our understanding and our acting. Where we optimise our 
actions against fixed goals, as for instance in consequentialism, we obscure the circularity of 
practice and so the possibility of pursuing internal goods. This applies also to where we justify 
ourselves in terms of objectivity, rigidly follow predetermined rules or otherwise apply theory 
linearly to practice. It is not that, when we act in these ways, we are pursuing an alternative 
linear form of practice. The circularity between acting and understanding is still there, and we 
may well adjust the rules we follow or the way we apply our understanding, but we give 
ourselves little opportunity to learn or to generate new possibilities as we act, with the result 
that we become predictable and repetitive. In this respect the value of von Foerster’s (2003c) 
invocation that we put ethics into practice rather than into words is not solely a matter of 
avoiding moralising and taking responsibility. Articulating ethics as a series of moral rules or 
calculi to then be put into practice obstructs not just our personal responsibility but also the 
possibility of pursuing internal goals because our actions are rigidly specified in advance. 
This is, therefore, one way in which a cybernetic understanding makes a significant 
difference to how we act. Where we explain practice in terms of the linear application of 
theory, we obscure the possibility of internal goals. Where we understand practice as a 
circular relationship between understanding and action, there are always internal goals to 
pursue. Whether we explain our actions in terms of only external goals, or as also including 
those which are internal, leads to us placing value differently in the situation and so to 
significantly different ways of acting. These include the contrasting courses of actions 
suggested in the same circumstances by consequentialism and virtue ethics and the 
difference between the sort of architecture or brickwork which have responded only to 
external goals, such as finishing the job on time or on budget, and that which has also 
pursued internal goods such as their spatial qualities or craftsmanship. Our understanding of 
the relation between our understanding and our acting (our theories of theory and practice) 
makes a difference, therefore, to how we act. That this is the case is, itself, an instance of the 
circular relation between acting and understanding. That is, when we understand practice in 
cybernetic terms, and so as a relationship between our acting and our understanding of this 
acting, then, in turn this understanding has consequences for our acting out of our practicing 
because, like any other understanding of our acting, it is in cybernetic relation to it. 
 
Notes 
1. As well as in its conferences, the ASC explored this question through a competition, won 
by Mick Ashby (Glanville, 2012, pp. 197-210). Entries to the competition can be found at: 
www.asc-cybernetics.org/CofC 
2. The point is not that the conversational format is necessarily a better one but that it offers 
 
 
This article is © Emerald Group Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear here <http://eprints.brighton.ac.uk>. Emerald does 
not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Emerald Group Publishing 
Limited. 
8 
something different. 
3. Glanville (2007c, p. 1182) makes an analogy with Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics: 
circular causality, like Einsteinian mechanics, is the more general case while linear causality, 
like Newtonian mechanics, is a still viable but specific limitation. 
4. Note that this discussion of internal and external goals is not one that corresponds to a 
distinction between first- and second-order cybernetics regarding the position of the observer 
but rather is regarding the qualities of a goal in relation to the actions that pursue it. My 
argument is therefore along different lines to the points made by Glanville (1997, 2004b). 
5. The continuity between the conception of purpose in cybernetics and that in the Aristotelian 
tradition that I explore here is not surprising. Cybernetics reintroduced questions regarding 
purpose into scientific debate where they had, with Aristotle, long fallen out of favour to be 
replaced by more mechanical and linear accounts of cause. While Rosenblueth and Wiener 
(1950) distance themselves from final causes, understanding purpose in terms of circularity 
removes the problem of final causes somehow having happened after the event (as noted by 
Stewart, 2000). As von Foerster (2003c) has put it: “we are all cyberneticians (whether or not 
we call ourselves such) whenever we justify our actions without using the words ‘because of 
[…],’ or ‘à cause de […],’ but with the phrase in English ‘in order to […],’ which in French is 
much more Aristotelian, ‘à fin de […]’” (p. 298). 
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